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Post-Trial Plea Bargaining in Capital 
Cases: Using Conditional Clemency to 
Remove Weak Cases from Death Row 
Adam M. Gershowitz∗ 
Abstract 
Plea bargaining accounts for over ninety percent of 
criminal convictions and it dominates the American criminal 
justice system. Yet, once a defendant is convicted, bargaining 
almost completely disappears from the system. Even though 
years of litigation are on the horizon, there is nearly no 
bargaining in the appellate and habeas corpus process. There 
are two reasons for this. First, prosecutors and courts typically 
lack the power to alter a sentence that has already been 
imposed. Second, even if prosecutors had the authority to 
negotiate following a conviction, they would have little incentive 
to do so. Affirmance rates in ordinary criminal cases approach 
ninety-five percent in many jurisdictions. Because the 
government has little incentive to bargain, defendants slowly 
churn their way through the formal appellate and habeas 
process. 
The lack of post-trial bargaining makes perfect sense in 
ordinary criminal cases. It does not make as much sense in 
death-penalty cases, however. Death sentences are followed by 
decades of litigation. And, more importantly, challenges to 
death sentences are often successful. Capital cases are reversed 
at alarming rates, and re-trials typically follow the reversals. 
Faced with years of appellate litigation that it might not win, 
and the prospect of a re-trial and another slew of appeals, the 
State should have an incentive to bargain in its weakest cases. 
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And the convicted individualfaced with a death 
sentencelikely has an even stronger incentive to bargain.  
This Article argues that governors should not simply think 
about clemency as a tool to prevent morally questionable 
executions. Rather, governors should regularly exercise their 
commutation power as a form of plea bargaining to clear weak 
cases out of the system. In exchange for inmates foregoing 
further appeals, governors could commute death sentences to 
terms of imprisonment. Clemency bargaining fits squarely 
within governors’ unreviewable commutation power and would 
save tens of millions of dollars by ending decades of unruly 
litigation. 
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I. Introduction 
There are roughly 3,000 inmates on death row in the United 
States.1 The number has declined slightly in recent 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-
year?scid=9&did=188#year (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (tracking the United States death 
row population from 1968–2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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years,2  but by and large the size of death row has remained the 
same for two decades.3 The reason for the backlog is obvious: 
juries sentence defendants to death, but executions are not 
carried out until, on average, fifteen years later.4 Furthermore, 
executions are the exception. Inmates primarily leave death row 
not because they were executed, but because of successful 
appeals.5 Indeed, the appellate process is so long and burdensome 
that hundreds of death-row inmates have died of natural causes 
before being executed.6 Unlike during the first half of the 
twentieth century,7 inmates rarely leave death row because a 
governor or pardon board has studied the case and decided to 
grant clemency. The numbers are staggering. Since the 
reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976, over 3,000 death 
sentences have been reversed by courts,8 nearly 1,500 people 
have been executed,9 and more than 400 inmates have died while 




                                                                                                     
 2. At its height, there were almost 3,600 people on death row in the United 
States. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. For instance, the average time from death sentence to execution for the 
inmates executed in 2013 was 186 months—over fifteen and a half years. See 
TRACEY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013: 
Statistical Tables, Tbl. 10, 14 (Dec. 2014) (charting by year the average time 
between sentencing and execution). In 2011, it was sixteen and a half years. Id. 
 5. See id. at 19 (indicating that as of 2013, 194 inmates had their 
convictions or sentences reversed in contrast to 1,359 executions).  
 6. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT—2009 Tbl. 20 
(Dec. 2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATISTICS] (identifying 416 
people who left death row because of a non-execution death from 1973 to 2009). 
 7. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital 
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 266 (1990–91) (noting clemency in 
one of five capital cases). 
 8. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATISTICS, supra note 6  (detailing death row 
statistics). 
 9. See Number of Executions Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2016) (referencing a high of ninety-eight people executed in 
1999) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
1362 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1359 (2016) 
have been less than seventy individualized grants10 of clemency.11 
A system in which the government spends decades fighting to 
protect thousands of death sentences to see only a fraction of 
them carried out is inefficient. And that inefficiency is very 
expensive. States are spending millions of dollars litigating 
capital cases that do not end in executions.12 There are, of course, 
approaches that could lead to a more efficient capital punishment 
system. Courts could affirm more death sentences. Judges could 
process appeals and habeas petitions more quickly.13 States could 
abolish capital punishment altogether and allow death rows to 
empty out through a combination of a few executions, some 
reversals, and inmates dying of natural causes. 14 Similarly, 
juries could simply stop sentencing inmates to death. Or 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital Clemency, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking the Timing] (advocating 
for a “threshold clemency determination” that occurs earlier in the criminal 
justice process). 
 11. There have been a handful of mass commutations in which governors 
emptied death row as they exited office. See Michael Heise, The Death of Death 
Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV. 949, 
963 (2015) (“[C]lemency activity for death row inmates—never terribly notable 
since 1977—has remained flat, at best, or trended down slightly, save for 
explainable ‘spikes’ associated with mass clemency activity.”). 
 12. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties 
Should Be Required To Post a Bond to Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 861, 890–91 (2007) [hereinafter Pay Now, Execute Later] (discussing 
estimates that “large states such as California and Florida could save tens of 
millions of dollars per year by eliminating capital punishment”); see also 
Carol Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New 
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 117, 121 
(discussing how New Jersey abandoned the death penalty in part because they 
were not actually executing anyone on death row and were spending a 
considerable amount of money on appeals). 
 13. This was part of the impetus for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act. See Lyn Entzeroth, Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, 
Where Are We Now?: A Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 49, 52 (2003) (quoting President Clinton saying “[f]or too long, 
and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in the way of 
justice being served”). 
 14. This has happened in some states. Between 2005 and 2012, five states 
abolished the death penalty. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking 
Small, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 408 (2013) (noting that the cost of the death 
penalty plays “a critical role in the decision to abandon capital punishment as 
the ultimate sanction”). 
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prosecutors could choose to seek the death penalty in only the 
rarest of cases.15 Those approaches, however, require big changes 
by a huge number of actors in the criminal justice system. It is 
difficult to affect meaningful change when success depends on 
unifying the behavior of thousands of judges, prosecutors, 
legislators, or jurors. 
This Article does not take a position on whether the death 
penalty is good or bad public policy. Nor do I suggest that we 
should have a larger or smaller number of executions. Instead, I 
take as a starting point the premise that we will have the same 
number of executions that the United States has carried out over 
the last few decades.  
My argument is that we should have a better process for 
eliminating costly and legally debatable death sentences from the 
system earlier in the process. Prosecutors and defense lawyers 
should not spend fifteen years and thousands of work hours 
fighting over death sentences that are unlikely to be carried out. 
Instead, governors16 should utilize their unique commutation 
power to remove weak cases—those that will eat up years of 
resources but probably not end in executions—from the criminal 
                                                                                                     
 15. To a certain extent this is already happening. The number of new death 
sentences is down dramatically in the last few years. In 2013, there were eighty-
two death sentences in the United States. In 2014, the number fell to seventy-
three. And in 2015, it was only forty-nine. See Death Sentences in the United 
States From 1977 by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-
2008 (last visited June 16, 2016) (tracking the decline in death sentences per 
year ) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of course, even those 
low numbers still exceeded the number of executions in each year. See Number 
of Executions Since 1976, supra note 9 (reporting thirty-nine executions in 2013, 
thirty-five in 2014, and twenty-eight in 2015).  
 16. Typically, the governor has the sole authority to grant clemency. In a 
few states, however, the pardon board has some or all of the authority. For a 
summary, see generally Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable: 
Reinvigorating the Use of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
751, 787 (2013) (arguing that state clemency procedures “must satisfy minimal 
procedural due process”). The main thesis of this articlethat governors should 
use clemency power to plea bargainapplies with equal force to pardon boards. 
Indeed, because they are more politically insulated, the argument should apply 
with even greater force to pardon boards. 
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justice system. And governors should utilize that power early in 
the appellate process.17  
This Article proposes that governors engage in post-trial plea 
bargaining with death-row inmates. In the weakest casesthose 
where it seems likely that a conviction or death sentence might 
be reversed on direct appeal or habeas corpusgovernors should 
offer a deal to the inmate. If the inmate drops all of his appeals 
and agrees not to file future habeas petitions, his death sentence 
will be commuted to life without parole or some other term of 
imprisonment. In the same way that prosecutors plead out weak 
cases before trial, governors should plead out weak capital cases 
during the appellate and habeas process. 
The use of gubernatorial plea bargaining fits squarely in the 
American criminal justice system. Plea bargaining has become so 
important that the Supreme Court has recognized that it is no 
longer just an “adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the 
criminal justice system.”18 Over ninety percent of criminal 
convictions result from plea bargaining.19 Yet, there is virtually 
no post-trial plea bargaining in the American criminal justice 
system.20 There are likely two reasons for this. First, prosecutors 
and courts likely lack the power to alter a sentence that has 
already been imposed.21 Second, even if prosecutors had the 
                                                                                                     
 17. Although pardons and commutations typically come on the eve of 
executions, there is no requirement that governors leave them until after the 
end of the appellate process. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 92 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1939) (noting that California governors can grant clemency any time 
after conviction and even before a sentence is handed down); COLO. REV. STAT. 
16-17-101 (2015) (authorizing capital commutations “when [the governor] deems 
it proper”). 
 18. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert Scott 
& William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 
(1992)). 
 19. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, Table 5.22.2009, http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (compiling data that tracks how many criminal 
defendants per year received a conviction by agreeing to a plea bargain).  
 20. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2006) (“In 
the grand scheme of things, however, habeas settlements are very rare.”). 
 21. See id. at 37 (“The finalthough importantexplanation for the low 
prevalence of habeas settlements is that few state courts and no federal courts 
have the power to amend a sentence after sentencing.”). Professor Malani 
suggests that Congress amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 “to permit 
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authority to negotiate following a conviction, they would have 
little incentive to do so. Affirmance rates in ordinary criminal 
cases are extremely high.22 For example, in Harris County, 
Texasthe so-called capital of capital punishment23the district 
attorney’s office has an overall affirmance rate in excess of 
ninety-five percent.24 With such high affirmance rates, the 
government has little incentive to bargain after trial. This 
explains why plea bargaining is a pre-trial phenomenon and why 
defendants instead spend the post-trial process slowly churning 
their way through the formal appellate and habeas process rather 
than negotiating deals. 
The same logic, however, should not hold for capital cases. 
Death sentences are followed by decades of litigation.25 And that 
litigation often results in reversal of convictions and death 
sentences. In a path-breaking study, Professor James Liebman 
and his colleagues documented that between 1973 and 1995, 
sixty-eight percent of death sentences were reversed on direct 
appeal or habeas review.26 Of course, as Professor Liebman and 
                                                                                                     
courts, upon the government’s motion, to amend a prisoner’s sentence if she 
drops her habeas claims, regardless of whether the modified sentence was 
within the statutory or guideline range for the prisoner’s offense.” Id. at 48. For 
another interesting bargaining proposalthis one on a systemic basissee 
James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 
332–34 (2002) (suggesting the exchange of procedural safeguards, such as 
videotaped confessions and more robust direct review, for foregoing some state 
and federal habeas review). 
 22. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, WIS. L. REV. 291, 320–21 (2006) (noting that 
“reversals in criminal cases are quite rare”). 
 23. See Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital 
Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (2009) (exploring the death 
penalty process in Harris County, Texas, and comparing it to other counties 
across the United States). 
 24. Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. OF THE DISTRICT ATT’Y, HARRIS 
COUNTY, TEX.. http://app.dao.hctx.net/FAQs/2/Appellate.aspx (last visited Sept. 
7, 2016) (describing other appellate avenues that are available to defendants in 
the event that their convictions are affirmed) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing how executions are 
not carried out until, on average, fifteen years after the initial sentencing). 
 26. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS 
SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 422–28 
(2002) (explaining that “the death penalty in this country is a broken system 
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other scholars have recognized in subsequent work, reversals 
have become less frequent in recent years.27 Nevertheless, it 
remains quite common for capital convictions and death 
sentences to be reversed.28 
It also almost goes without saying that capital cases are 
much more expensive than ordinary cases at the post-trial 
stages.29 Unlike ordinary defendants, many death-row inmates 
are represented by counsel in the habeas process.30 The death 
penalty bar specializes in capital litigation and files detailed 
appellate briefs that require considerable time and attention from 
the attorney general’s office as well as judges and clerks.  
We therefore know that (1) capital cases are much more 
expensive than ordinary cases and (2) states lose a considerable 
number of death penalty cases during the appellate and habeas 
process.31 Now add two other facts: (3) states are struggling 
                                                                                                     
that is of rising concern to many Americans”). 
 27. See James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s 
Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 337 n.415 (2011) 
(“Given Congress’s adoption of legislation in 1996 reducing federal prisoners’ 
access to federal habeas corpus review, it is likely that the reversal rate in 
federal court has declined recently.”); NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM 
AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 61 (2007) (reviewing 267 capital 
cases filed between 2000 and 2002 and finding that twelve percent received 
habeas relief in federal district court). 
 28. See Jordan M. Steiker, Peculiar Times for a Peculiar Institution, 48 
TULSA L. REV. 357, 365 (2012) (explaining that “reversal rates in capital cases 
reached astonishing levels in the first two decades following [Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)] and remain significant (albeit diminished) today”). 
 29. See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
475, 544–45 (2013) (discussing studies indicating that, in Maryland, capital 
appeals cost five times more than non-capital cases, and that in Kansas, capital 
appeals cost twenty times more than non-capital appeals).  
 30. See KING ET AL., supra note 27, at 62 (2007) (noting that “all but seven 
percent of death row filers have counsel to assist them in seeking federal habeas 
relief, while all but seven percent of non-capital prisoners proceed pro se”). 
 31. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 65 (1997) (explaining that 
death-row inmates “often have very high-quality volunteer representation on 
habeas corpus” and as a result there “has been both a large volume of habeas 
litigation in capital cases and strikingly high success rates for capital 
defendants”). 
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financially,32 and (4) while counties initiate capital prosecutions, 
it is typically the states that pay the bills for the appellate and 
habeas process.33 Faced with these four facts, states should be 
willing to plea bargain after trial if they think a death sentence is 
unlikely to survive on appeal and actually result in execution. 
That plea bargaining should logically fall to the only executive 
branch actor with authority to stop the death penalty process—
the governor.  
Put another way, governors are elected to act in the best 
interests of their states. When they see a weak death sentence 
moving through the system that is likely to cost the state 
considerable litigation costs but not end in execution, the 
governor should step forward and cut a deal that eliminates the 
costly litigation. The inmate, in turn, should want the deal in 
order to eliminate the possibility of being executed. 
Requiring an inmate to forego future appeals in exchange 
for clemency is what is called a “conditional commutation.”34 
Presidents and governors have sporadically used conditional 
commutations in the past. For instance, chief executives have 
commuted non-capital sentences in exchange for inmates 
renouncing terrorism, pursuing a high school degree, and even 
donating a kidney.35 Although there is not a tremendous amount 
of case law, the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld 
conditional commutations in the past.36 And because the 
condition would be the waiver of appealssomething that 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Julie Bosman, States Confront Cavernous Holes in Their Budgets, 
N.Y. TIMES, (June 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/us/states-
confront-wide-budget-gaps-even-after-years-of-recovery.html?_r=0 (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2016) (discussing the major funding gaps confronting many state 
legislatures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 33. See Pay Now, Execute Later, supra note 12, at 864 n.18 (offering several 
examples of states that pay for these appeals). 
 34. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional 
Pardoning Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1668 (2001) (noting that “from 
President Washington on, presidents have attached conditions to many pardons 
and commutations”). 
 35. See infra notes 81–106 and accompanying text (discussing some of the 
more extreme restrictions that governors have placed on grants of clemency). 
 36. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme 
Court is not opposed to some of these odd clemency arrangements). 
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regularly occurs in pre-trial plea bargaining37it is nearly 
certain that the conditional commutation would be well within 
governors’ authority.38  
In short, conditional commutations have occurred throughout 
American history, and they appear to be perfectly 
constitutional.39 To date, however, governors have not used 
conditional commutations as a form of post-trial plea bargaining 
to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system. Of 
course, there are political reasons why governors are reluctant to 
exercise their clemency power.40 But in an era when a few states 
have abolished capital punishment altogether because of its 
astronomical cost,41 the exercise of capital clemency may not be 
the third rail of politics that it has long been.42 Now may be the 
time for executive clemency to become a regular part of an 
efficient death penalty process.  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II briefly reviews the 
paltry state of capital clemency. Part III describes not just the low 
number of death penalty commutations over the last forty years, 
but also how those commutations are typically reserved for claims 
of innocence or other defendant-specific characteristics, rather 
than to facilitate a functional criminal justice system. Part III 
then recounts some significant conditional commutations that 
have been issued over the years. Part IV explains why a deal in 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market: From 
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) 
(“[M]ost guilty pleas waive defendants’ rights to appeal.”). 
 38. See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text (explaining how some 
governors have experienced political fallout after granting clemency). 
 39. See Conditional Pardons, 1 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1821) (“The 
President has power to grant a conditional pardon to a convict, provided the 
condition be compatible with the genius of our constitution and laws.”). 
 40. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital 
Clemency, 17 J. L. & POL. 669, 671 (2001) [hereinafter The Diffusion of 
Responsibility] (noting that governors seeking reelection rarely exercise their 
clemency power). 
 41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing five states that 
have abolished the death penalty). 
 42. Indeed, Professor Michael Heise’s empirical work casts doubt on the 
conventional wisdom that politicians are completely unwilling to exercise their 
clemency power. See Heise, supra note 11, at 979–84 (listing governors who 
have emptied death row as they left office). 
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which a governor commutes a death sentence in exchange for the 
inmate foregoing any future appeals would be perfectly 
constitutional. Parts V and VI then address the most likely 
objections to my proposal. Part V explains how it would be 
possible for governors to know early in the appellate process of 
many capital cases that a reversal is more likely than an 
execution. Part VI then addresses the objection that politics will 
prevent governors from using their commutation power to plea 
bargain. 
II. Capital Clemency Is Rare Overall and Used for Limited 
Reasons 
It is well known that capital clemency in the United States is 
rare. Governors dispense mercy from death sentences far less 
often than in decades past.43 Moreover, governors typically grant 
capital clemency only for a narrow range of reasons. This Part 
briefly recounts the quantitative decline in capital clemency over 
the last century and explains how commutations are reserved for 
a very limited set of rationales.  
As Professor Hugo Adam Bedau documented, capital 
clemency was fairly robust in the first half of the twentieth 
century. One out of every four or five death sentences was 
commuted.44 For instance, between 1900 and 1958 there were 101 
death sentences and thirty commutations in Massachusetts.45 In 
New York from 1920 to 1936 there were 252 death sentences and 
eighty-three commutations.46 Even southern statestoday’s so-
called death belthad significant numbers of commutations. 
Texas alone commuted eighty-five death sentences between 1924 
and 1968.47 
Matters are far different today. In the forty years since 
capital punishment was reinstated in the United Statesfrom 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Bedau, supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the 
declining rate of clemency). 
 44. Id. at 266. 
 45. Id. at 265. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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1976 to 2015only 280 death row inmates have received 
clemency.48 And that number is dramatically inflated by “mass 
commutations” in which a handful of governors have emptied 
death row.49 Most notably, in 2003, Governor George Ryan 
commuted all of death row in Illinois (167 people) because of 
flaws in the state’s capital punishment system and an alarming 
number of exonerations.50 Additionally, there have been smaller 
mass commutations that have emptied death rows in New 
Mexico, Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, and a second time in 
Illinois.51 In total, mass commutations account for roughly 210 of 
the 280 capital clemency grants over the last forty years.52 In 
only about seventy cases over the last forty years have governors 
or pardon boards individually analyzed an inmate’s case and 
decided to commute a sentence or pardon the inmate.53  
To put matters in perspective, consider the number of death 
sentences, executions, and individualized commutations over the 
last forty years. From 1977 to 2015, there were 7,867 death 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
clemency (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (noting that the humanitarian reasons for 
clemency include “doubts about the defendant’s guilt or judgments about the 
death penalty by the governor”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 49. See infra notes 50–52 (discussing recent instances of mass 
commutations). 
 50. See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death 
Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003) http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 
01/12/us/citing-issue-of-fairness-governor-clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html 
(last visited July 9, 2016) (describing Governor Ryan’s decision to commute the 
sentences of all inmates on death row) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Some observers (and prosecutors) have suggested that Governor 
Ryan commuted death row out of personal interest because he was facing 
indictment on criminal misconduct charges (for which he was subsequently 
convicted and incarcerated) and thought the commutations would help his 
reputation. See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH ROW: 
GOVERNOR GEORGE RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 137 (2008) (“Prosecutors 
suggested, subtly but unmistakably, that Ryan’s blanket clemency for death row 
prisoners was designed to overshadow his impending indictment.”). 
 51. Clemency, supra note 48. 
 52. See id. (listing each commutation); see also Rethinking the Timing, 
supra note 10, at 13 (reviewing the sixty-six individualized commutations 
through 2014). 
 53. Id. 
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sentences in the United States, but only 1,422 executions.54 Of 
the more than 6,000 remaining people who sat on death row 
(many of whom stayed there for many years), only about seventy 
people received an individualized commutation.55 
The conventional wisdom for the small number of capital 
clemencies is well known: commutations and pardons are not 
good politics. Governors who aspire to run for president likely 
have great concern about the unpopularity of commuting death 
sentences.56 The politics of crime became much more punitive in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Richard Nixon 
campaigned for the presidency on a law-and-order campaign in 
1968.57 Longer, harsher sentences became a fixture of the 1980s 
as rehabilitation went out of style and was replaced by 
retributivism and deterrence as the goals of punishment.58 Led by 
President Clinton, Democrats eventually adopted the tough-on-
crime rhetoric as well.59 In an environment in which mercy and 
rehabilitation took a backseat to retribution and deterrence, it is 
not surprising that governors and their appointed pardon boards 
became less willing to grant clemency.60 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (compiling the data on the race of death row inmates) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2641, 2688–89 (2011) (discussing political dangers of 
clemency). 
 57. See generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? 
Rethinking The Warren Court’s Role in Criminal Procedure, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1361, 1364 (2004). 
 58. See Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too 
Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 691, 
698 (2010) (“The public, and certain members of the academy, gave up on 
rehabilitation as a central purpose of sentencing, instead championing a 
philosophy known as ‘limited’ retribution.”). 
 59. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It? The Political, 
Social Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development 
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 42–43 (1997) (noting the 
realization of Congressional Democrats in the 1990s that “their traditional 
support of more liberal crime policies had become a major political liability”). 
 60. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of 
Criminal Law, 90 NYU L. REV. 802, 815–18 (2015) [hereinafter Clemency and 
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The politics of crime help to explain the limited reasons why 
governors grant clemency. With the exception of sporadic mass 
commutations, governors have consistently adopted a fairly 
narrow set of reasons for granting capital clemency. In his 1991 
article, Professor Bedau recounted the reasons for mercy in 
capital cases.61 He found that governors granted clemency for 
possible innocence; proportionality with co-defendants’ sentences; 
public opposition to the death penalty (in the 1960s); 
unconstitutionality of death penalty statutes; rehabilitation of the 
offender; mitigating factors about the inmate’s background; and, 
in the case of one governor, a non-unanimous decision by the 
appellate courts about the legality of defendants’ convictions.62 
Matters have not changed much in the modern era. Not 
surprisingly, the most common reason for capital clemency over 
the last forty years has been doubts about an inmate’s guilt. In 
roughly two-dozen of the seventy individualized commutations, 
the primary rationale for mercy was doubt about the guilt of the 
death-row inmate.63 In other cases, governors have pointed to 
proportionality concerns (such as a co-defendant not being 
sentenced to death64 or the inmate not being the trigger-
person).65 In some cases,66 governors commuted sentences 
because of characteristics about the inmate, such as mental 
                                                                                                     
Presidential Administration] (explaining how the lack of parole and “tough on 
crime” attitudes reduced clemency). 
 61. See Bedau, supra note 7, at 259–60 (discussing a grant of clemency 
when the Supreme Court expressed concern about a death penalty sentence). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Rethinking the Timing, supra note 10, at 7–12 (discussing nine 
cases in detail); Clemency, supra note 48 (summarizing clemency rationale in 
each case for the last forty years). 
 64. See, e.g., Governor of Indiana Spares Death Row Inmate, L.A. TIMES 
(July 3, 2004) http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/03/nation/na-spare3 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (listing the governor’s reasoning as unfairness, since 
another co-defendant only received a life in prison sentence) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See Ralph Blumenthal, Governor Commutes Sentence in Texas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/31execute.html 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the commutation of Kenneth Foster) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 66. See Clemency, supra note 48 (summarizing clemency rationale in each 
case for the last forty years). 
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health problems,67 abusive childhood,68 or rehabilitation while in 
prison.69 In a small number of cases, governors commuted 
sentences for less conventional reasons such as requests from the 
prosecutor,70 the victim’s family,71 and even the Pope.72 
Very few commutations have been granted over the last forty 
years because of flaws in the legal process of a case. In a few 
cases, governors appeared to base commutations in part on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.73 However, in each of these 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Donald P. Baker, Va. Governor Commutes First Death Sentence, 
WASH. POST (May 13, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/local/daily/may99/swann13.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the 
commutation of Calvin E. Swann) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 68. See Randall Chase, Del. Governor Spares Life of Killer, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-01-18/news/30639619_1_pardons-
board-commutation-death-sentence (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the 
4–1 decision of the parole board in favor of commutation influenced Governor 
Markell’s decision to commute Robert Gattis’ sentence) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See Justin M. Norton, Virginia Gov. Commute Death Sentence; 
Colorado Gov. Denies Clemency, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 15, 1997), 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/Virginia-Gov-commutes-death-sentence-
Colorado-Gov-denies-clemency/id-63ebbf83bbfe750ebdeb591bb8a104fb (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing the commutation of William Ira Saunders) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 70. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Gov. John Kasich Commutes Inmate’s Death 
Sentence to Life in Prison, PLAIN DEALER (July 10, 2012, 11:53 PM) 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/07/ohio_governor_commutes_inm
ates.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the prosecutor’s 
recommendation was one of multiple factors) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 71. See Ronald Smothers, A Day Short of Death, a Georgia Killer Is Given 
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1990) http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/22/us/a-day-
short-of-death-a-georgia-killer-is-given-life.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(noting that the advocates for granting William Moore clemency included 
Mother Teresa and Rev. Jesse Jackson) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 72. See Stephanie Simon, Pope’s Appeal for Mercy Saves Murderer’s Life, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1999) http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/29/news/mn-
2872/2 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing how Pope John Paul II influenced 
the Missouri governor’s decision to grant clemency to Darrell Mease) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. See Kristin M. Hall, Tenn. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 14, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-
14-1360199315_x.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that Governor 
Bredesen commuted an inmate’s death sentence because of what he described as 
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cases, even though the rationale for clemency was a flaw (or 
perceived flaw) in the legal process, the governor seemingly 
granted clemency because the legal flaw rendered the execution 
morally questionable.  
History therefore seems to tell us that clemency is limited to 
cases where governors think an execution would be morally 
questionable. This differs dramatically from the pre-trial plea 
bargaining process. History tells us that before trial it is perfectly 
appropriate for prosecutors to bargain to make the criminal 
justice system run smoothly. Over-crowded dockets are 
ameliorated by plea bargaining.74 Weak cases are resolved by 
charge bargains to a lower-level offense or sentence bargains to a 
shorter term of imprisonment.75 And plea bargaining is alive and 
well at the pre-trial stage in capital cases as well. Prosecutors 
regularly seek deathperhaps as a bargaining chip to induce a 
guilty plea76but ultimately agree to a non-capital sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea.77 More crassly stated, prosecutors 
regularly consider resources and the efficiency of the criminal 
                                                                                                     
“grossly inadequate legal representation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 74. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 13 (2003). 
 75. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2500 (2004). 
 76. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2030, 2097 (2000) (explaining that a capital charge “provides the best plea-
bargaining leverage imaginable”). 
 77. Professor John Douglass recently provided a startling description of 
Virginia’s capital charging:  
Virginia prosecutors now charge about twenty cases of capital murder 
annually for each case that results in a death sentence. What 
happens to the other nineteen cases? Plea bargaining fills much of 
that gap. Today, even more than in years past, Virginia’s death 
penalty functions primarily as a bargaining chip in a plea negotiation 
process that resolves most capital litigation with sentences less than 
death. 
John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and the Future 
of Virginia’s Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 873–74 (2015); see also 
Thaxton, supra note 29, at 483 (analyzing charging decisions in Georgia from 
1993 to 2000 and concluding that “my conservative estimate is that the threat of 
the death penalty increases the likelihood of reaching a plea agreement by 
approximately 20 percentage points”). 
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justice process before trial. By contrast, at the capital clemency 
stage, governors never appear to consider those factors. 
There are three obvious reasons why governors do not engage 
in clemency bargaining after trial. First, they almost always 
consider clemency petitions at the very end of the road after 
courts have already rejected appeals and habeas corpus 
petitions.78 At that point, there is no bargaining to be done 
because the inmate has nothing to give up. A governor who 
grants clemency on the eve of an execution gets nothing in return 
because there is no litigation left for the inmate to terminate. 
Second, and relatedly, clemency supposedly must be left until the 
end of the process because governors would lack the necessary 
information to make an informed determination in the middle of 
litigation. Third, as noted above, it is considered politically 
undesirable for governors to grant clemency. In order to protect 
their future political aspirations, governors avoid using their 
clemency power except in the most extreme cases.  
As I explain in Parts V and VI below, I do not think the latter 
two explanations are insurmountable obstacles to using clemency 
as a plea bargaining tool. The objections may explain the current 
state of affairs, but they are not necessarily the approach that 
must guide us moving forward. Before addressing the practical 
objections to post-trial plea bargaining though, I turn in Part III 
to negotiated, or so-called “conditional,” clemency, which has been 
awarded in the past and, in Part IV, to the legality of such 
clemency deals. 
III. Governors and Presidents Have Issued Conditional Clemency 
Governors and presidents have wide power to grant 
clemency.79 The general public likely thinks of the clemency 
power as an all-or-nothing approach.80 People might think that 
                                                                                                     
 78. See Rethinking the Timing, supra note 10, at 2–3 (arguing that 
governors should not wait until the end of the process to consider clemency). 
 79. For a classic work on the history and scope of the clemency power, see 
generally KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST (1989) (discussing pardons, reprieves, amnesty, and commutations). 
 80. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
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the president has the binary choice of pardoning an individual 
(and wiping out his conviction) or doing nothing. Or the public 
might think that a governor can choose only between commuting 
a death sentence or taking no action. This is the set of choices we 
are familiar with because this is what happens most often. 
Clemency usually takes the form of complete pardons or sentence 
reductions. In fact, however, the clemency power is not an all-or-
nothing option. Rather, because the clemency power is so broad, 
governors and presidents actually have quite a bit of room to 
creatively exercise their authority. Some chief executives have 
done just that. 
Some of the most famous conditional commutations have 
been issued by presidents. In 1971, President Nixon conditionally 
commuted the sentence of labor leader Jimmy Hoffa.81 Mr. Hoffa 
had been convicted of obstruction of justice and fraud and was 
part way through serving a thirteen-year sentence.82 President 
Nixon commuted Hoffa’s sentence and granted him immediate 
release, but he imposed the condition that Hoffa “not engage in 
direct or indirect management of any labor organization prior to 
March 6, 1980.”83 
In 1999, President Clinton offered conditional clemency to 
sixteen members of the Puerto Rican nationalist group F.A.L.N.84 
The condition was that, in exchange for clemency, each individual 
would have to renounce the use of terrorism to achieve 
                                                                                                     
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006) (“A gulf divides the knowledgeable, 
powerful participants inside American criminal justice from the poorly 
informed, powerless people outside of it.”). 
 81. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1225–45 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(exploring the historical development of the constitutional power to pardon and 
ultimately concluding that the pardon of Mr. Hoffa was lawful). 
 82. See id. at 1223–24 (noting that Mr. Hoffa first filed petitions for 
commutation in December 1971).  
 83. Id. at 1224. For a discussion of Hoffa’s case, see Patrick R. Cowlishaw, 
Note, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. 149, 154–55 (1975) 
(arguing that a potential for abuse exists within the conditional commutation 
framework).  
 84. See Charles Babington, Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ 
campaigns /keyraces2000/stories/faln091199.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(detailing how President Clinton offered the inmates clemency if they would 
renounce violence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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independence for Puerto Rico.85 Fourteen of the individuals 
accepted President Clinton’s terms and had their sentences 
commuted.86 Two other individuals refused the condition and 
declined the commutation.87 
On his last day in office in 2001, President Clinton commuted 
the sentences of thirty-six drug offenders.88 Those commutations 
included conditions. Some offenders had to take period drug tests 
and others were required to serve a period of supervised 
release.89 
As Dean Harold Kent has described, many other presidents 
have issued conditional commutations: 
From President Washington on, presidents have attached 
conditions to many pardons and commutations. President 
Lincoln’s offer of amnesty to Southern secessionists on the 
condition that they take a loyalty oath marks one controversial 
example. . . . [P]residents have required, on pain of revocation 
of the pardon, that offenders make restitution, drop financial 
claims against the government or accept deportation. Perhaps 
more surprisingly, presidents have required that offenders not 
drink, not associate with undesirables, and provide their 
families with greater financial support.90 
Some of those presidential commutations have attached 
dramatic and invasive conditions. For instance, President 
Coolidge commuted a prison sentence but required that the 
inmate 
shall abstain from the possession and use of intoxicating 
liquor; shall not associate with persons of evil character; shall 
lead an orderly, industrious life; shall work and reside where 
                                                                                                     
 85. See John M. Broder, 12 Imprisoned Puerto Ricans Accept Clemency 
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/08/us/12-
imprisoned-puerto-ricans-accept-clemency-conditions.html?page wanted=all (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (“The conditions of their commutation include that they 
commit no further crimes and that they limit their association with other Puerto 
Rican nationalists who advocate violence.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 86. Babington, supra note 84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Krent, supra note 34, at 1667. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1668.  
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the Attorney General of the United States, through the 
Superintendent of Prisons of the Department of Justice, shall 
direct; shall maintain and support his divorced wife and their 
children to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, and shall 
report his residence and occupation to the said Superintendent 
of Prisons between the first and fifth days of each month.91 
Governors have likewise issued conditional commutations. In 
a famous case, Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia offered 
conditional clemency to the basketball star Allen Iverson. While 
in high school (when he was already an All-American and sought 
after by colleges around the country), Iverson was involved in a 
brawl and was accused of striking a woman with a chair.92 
Iverson was convicted of multiple felony charges and sentenced to 
fifteen years, with ten suspended.93 A few months later, after 
Iverson had served some jail time, Governor Wilder offered him 
conditional clemency: in exchange for release from prison, Iverson 
agreed to family counseling, a nightly curfew, and not playing 
sports while he finished high school.94 Two weeks later, Governor 
Wilder granted conditional clemency to two other individuals 
convicted in the same brawl. 95 According to news reports, “[t]he 
men . . . agree[d] to enroll in college and attend classes regularly, 
receive family counseling, observe a curfew of 10:30 p.m. on 
                                                                                                     
 91. Ex parte Weathers, 33 F.2d 294, 294 (S.D. Fla. 1929). 
 92. See Ken Armstrong, Iverson Goes to Jail, DAILY PRESS (Sept. 9, 1993), 
http://articles.dailypress.com/1993-09-09/news/9309090205_1_iverson-and-
three-allen-iverson-overton (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing Iverson’s 
conviction and sentencing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See School Star Wins Clemency, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 31, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/31/sports/school-star-wins-clemency.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that Iverson’s lawyers argued that there was 
reasonable doubt about his conviction) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 95. See Wilder Grants Clemency to Men in Iverson Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 
15, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1994/01/15/wilder-
grants-clemency-to-men-in-iverson-case/f30790c2-1072-4034-8046-e4eb3fc4530b/ 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing Governor Wilder’s decision to grant 
conditional clemency to the other men involved in the brawl) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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weekdays and midnight on weekends, and remain under Parole 
Board supervision.”96 
Governor Haley Barbour made an even more overtsome 
would say extremely distasteful97use of conditional clemency in 
Mississippi in 2010. Gladys and Jaime Scott had been sentenced 
to life imprisonment following an armed robbery involving only 
eleven dollars.98 Their case had attracted considerable national 
attention because of the small amount of money, the steep 
punishment, and allegations of racial bias.99 In addition, Jaime 
Scott was in poor health and needed a kidney transplant that 
likely would have been paid for by the state of Mississippi.100 
Governor Barbour acceded to the pressure to grant clemency, but 
attached a condition: in exchange for clemency, Gladys Scott 
would have to donate a kidney to Jaime Scott after release, thus 
shifting the costs to Medicaid and saving Mississippi from paying 
the costs of Jaime’s medical care.101 While Governor Barbour’s 
kidney transplant condition drew objections from 
bioethicists,102 the idea of conditioning commutation in the 
abstract drew little fire.103  
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: 
Diminishing the “Yuck Factor” in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate, 16 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 105–06 (2013) (noting that many people’s response to 
Governor Barbour’s grant of clemency was not rooted in a legal argument, but 
repugnance). 
 98. Id. at 126. 
 99. See Timothy Williams, Sisters’ Prison Release Is Tied to Donation of 
Kidney, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/us/31 
sisters.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (describing the pressure that Governor 
Barbour was under to issue clemency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Timothy Williams, Jailed Sisters Are Released for Kidney 
Transplant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08 
sisters.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (noting that the kidney transplant was 
the sisters’ idea) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. Indeed, you can find run-of-the-mill language about conditional 
commutations on state criminal justice websites. See, e.g., Clemency, OHIO DEP’T 
OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTIONS, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/clemency1. 
htm (last visited June 16, 2016) (noting that “[a] commutation may be 
conditional or unconditional”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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Of course, most conditional commutations do not involve 
terrorists, the most famous labor leader in history, legendary 
basketball stars, or organ donation. Rather, most conditional 
commutations actually involve the subject of this article: 
capital commutations. Governors often commute death 
sentences with the condition that inmates remain in prison for 
life without the possibility of parole.104 As I explain in the next 
Part, constitutional challenges to conditional commutations 
(including those involving the death penalty) have failed. 
IV. Clemency as Plea Bargaining Is Constitutional 
Would it be constitutional for a governor to strike a deal in 
which a death-row inmate agrees to forego all appeals and 
habeas petitions in exchange for a commutation to life 
imprisonment without parole? The answer appears to be “yes.” 
To start with the obvious, presidents and governors105 
have the power to commute a death sentence to life 
imprisonment.106 The Supreme Court held nearly one hundred 
years ago, in Biddle v. Perovich,107 that the president need not 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 104. For example, upon leaving office, President Eisenhower commuted the 
death sentence of a military prisoner on the condition that he never be eligible 
for parole. See Schlick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 268 (1974) (holding “that the 
conditional commutation of his death sentence was lawful when made and that 
intervening events have not altered its validity”). 
 105. Most of the authority discussed in this section involves presidential 
clemency. Gubernatorial commutations would also have to pass muster under 
the relevant state constitutions. Generally speaking, it is clear that clemency 
clauses in state constitutions are equally broad and thus the outcome is very 
unlikely to be different under state constitutional law.  
 106. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272 
(1998), which required that clemency procedures comport with a minimum 
standard of due process, reinforces the broad power of the executive. Chief 
executives cannot flip a coin or arbitrarily deny access to the clemency process, 
but beyond that a due process violation is extremely unlikely. As Professor 
Rachel Barkow has concluded in the presidential context “[t]he pardon power is, 
then, a sweeping constitutional power that is checked only by the political 
process and the power of voters to elect a new President should they disagree 
with the clemency decisions of the current one.” Clemency and Presidential 
Administration, supra note 60, at 813. 
 107. 274 U.S. 480 (1927). 
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even obtain the consent of an individual to commute his sentence 
from death to life.108 
Presidents and governors can attach conditions to 
commutations. In 1960, President Eisenhower commuted the 
punishment of a military inmate from death to life 
imprisonment.109 Because a pure commutation would have made 
Schick eligible for parole under military law, President 
Eisenhower imposed a condition that “Schick shall never have 
any rights, privileges, claims, or benefits arising under the parole 
and suspension or remission of sentence laws of the United 
States.”110 More than a decade after the conditional commutation, 
Schick sought parole and eventually filed suit over his 
eligibility.111 The Supreme Court rejected Schick’s challenge, 
explaining that “this Court has long read the Constitution as 
authorizing the President to deal with individual cases by 
granting conditional pardons.”112 The Court further recognized 
that in adding conditions to clemency, chief executives are not 
required to choose among conditions in the sentencing statutes. 
As the Court explained, “Presidents throughout our history as a 
Nation have exercised the power to pardon or commute sentences 
upon conditions that are not specifically authorized by statute.”113 
The next question is whether the president or governor can 
strike a deal in which the inmate agrees to a condition in 
exchange for a commutation. Once again, Supreme Court 
precedent clearly offers an affirmative answer. In 1852, President 
Fillmore offered to commute William Wells’ death sentence if he 
agreed to serve a life term.114 Wells agreed,115 but subsequently 
                                                                                                     
 108. In a slightly contradictory earlier decision the Court allowed a 
newspaper editor who had invoked the Fifth Amendment to refuse a pardon 
that would have compelled him to testify. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 
79, 94 (1915) (noting that it was Burdick’s right to refuse the pardon, and as 
such, it was his right to decline to testify).   
 109. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 257 (explaining that the inmate challenged the 
validity of the condition attached to his commutation).  
 110. Id. at 258. 
 111. Id. at 259. 
 112. Id. at 265. 
 113. Id. at 266. 
 114. See Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 308 (1856) (noting that Wells accepted 
the conditional commutation on the same day it was offered). As the Schick 
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argued, inter alia, that the condition was illegal because he 
accepted it under duress.116 The Supreme Court unequivocally 
rejected Wells’ challenges to the condition and enforced his 
agreement.117 
Thus far we have established that (1) chief executives can 
commute death sentences to life imprisonment without parole; 
(2) the president or governor can attach conditions to the 
commutations; (3) the conditions need not be affirmatively 
authorized by underlying statute or law; and (4) the condition can 
be the result of a bargained agreement with the inmate. The only 
remaining question for our purposes is whether certain conditions 
might be so egregious as to be unconstitutional and 
unenforceable. Here the answer is “maybe in some cases,” but 
certainly not in the case of a condition that requires an inmate to 
forego future appeals. 
There is far less precedent to determine whether certain 
conditions are constitutional. One could imagine that certain 
conditions would shock the conscience and be off-limits.118 To 
date, there is no clear precedent forbidding certain conditions. On 
the other hand, there is precedent approving conditions that are 
far more questionable than requiring inmates to forego future 
appeals. President Nixon’s conditional commutation of Jimmy 
Hoffa is the most instructive. 
After serving about four years of a thirteen-year sentence, 
the infamous labor leader Jimmy Hoffa petitioned President 
Nixon for a commutation.119 Hoffa contended that he would not 
be a drain on society if released because he could live on his 
                                                                                                     
decision later made clear, Wells’ agreement was not necessary. See supra notes 
104–109 and accompanying text (discussing Schick). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 315. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1666 (arguing that granting clemency in 
exchange for a kidney is an example of an agreement that “shocks the 
conscience”). 
 119. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (D.D.C. 1974) (noting that 
Mr. Hoffa represented in his petition that he “does not have routine problems 
usually faced by persons released from prison for the reason that he has a home, 
a devoted family, ties in the community, and adequate assurances of a 
continuing livelihood”). 
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pension and that he “intend[ed] to enter the educational field on a 
limited basis as a teacher, lecturer or educator, as may be 
approved by your Excellency.”120 Hoffa’s clemency petition thus 
insinuated that if he were released he would not return to labor 
organizing activities. President Nixon took Hoffa up on that offer. 
In December 1971, President Nixon commuted Hoffa’s sentence 
“upon the condition that the said James R. Hoffa not engage in 
direct or indirect management of any labor organization prior to 
March sixth, 1980.”121 Hoffa was released from prison but a few 
years later he challenged the labor organizing condition on the 
ground that it violated his First Amendment rights to free speech 
and association.122  
A federal district judge rejected Hoffa’s argument because 
“the history and nature of the pardoning power has always 
contemplated the type of broad discretion which would permit the 
repository of power to devise and attach lawful conditions to its 
clemency and to offer the same to the clemency applicant.”123 The 
court applied a two-part test that assessed (1) whether the 
condition was directly related to the public interest and 
(2) whether it unreasonably infringed on Hoffa’s constitutional 
rights.124 The court had “no hesitation” in finding that a 
restriction on Hoffa’s involvement in organized labor was directly 
related to the commutation of criminal offenses arising out of 
labor activities.125 And because the Supreme Court had 
authorized legislatures to restrict the post-release work activity 
of felons, the court found that the President had the same 
authority as part of his commutation power.126 
An even more startling condition was imposed by the 
governor of Ohio in 1980. Anthony Carchedi, who was serving a 
long prison sentence for armed robbery, sought parole and argued 
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1224. 
 122. See id. at 1240–41 (discussing how these claims had been raised by 
other prisoners based on conditions of their release set by statute). 
 123. Id. at 1234. 
 124. Id. at 1236. 
 125. Id. at 1237–38. 
 126. Id. at 1240 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.144 (1960)). 
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that he was not a threat to the citizens of Ohio because he had no 
family there and would leave the state immediately upon 
release.127 Although Carchedi was not paroled, the governor 
commuted his sentence on the condition that he not return to 
Ohio until the maximum term of his sentence had run (unless the 
parole board offered special permission).128 Only eight weeks 
after being released though, Carchedi sought to re-enter Ohio to 
visit his fiancée.129 The parole board rejected his request, setting 
up a challenge to the legality of what Cardechi called a 
“banishment” condition.130 The federal court in Ohio explained 
how broad the clemency power is under the Ohio Constitution, 
and that a condition will not be invalidated unless it is “found to 
be illegal, impossible of performance, or contrary to public 
policy.”131 The court recognized that the condition implicated 
constitutional rights of association and travel, but refused to find 
the condition illegal because Cardechi had willingly agreed to the 
condition.132 According to the federal court, an agreement to abide 
by a condition in exchange for release “is no different from other 
agreements in which the government conditions its grant of a 
substantial benefit on the relinquishment of a known 
constitutional right.”133 The court thus saw a conditional 
commutation as no different than a conventional plea bargain 
with a prosecutor in advance of trial.134 
The leading scholarly analysis about conditional clemency 
supports the conclusion (if not all of the reasoning) in Hoffa and 
Cardechi. As Dean Krent has explained, it would seemingly be 
improper to uphold a bargain in which a president granted a 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Cardechi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp. 1010, 1011–12 (S.D. Ohio 1982) 
(describing the conditions of Carchedi’s commutation). 
 128. Id. at 1012. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1013. 
 132. See id. at 1017 (noting that Cardechi had initiated the parole 
conversation with the governor and had brought up the “no return” option 
himself). 
 133. Id. at 1016. 
 134. See id. at 1017–18 (analyzing Cardechi’s waiver and finding that he 
knowingly and intelligently agreed to the terms presented by the state). 
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pardon in exchange for money or for a president to require the 
recipient of a pardon to attend Presbyterian Church services (as 
opposed to those of some other religion). The former would violate 
laws enacted by Congress; the latter would run afoul of the First 
Amendment.135 But absent cases in which the restriction of a 
constitutional right is so obvious that it “shocks society’s 
conscience,” the inmate’s autonomy interest in deciding whether 
to accept the condition should prevail.136  
If it is constitutional for a conditional commutation to impose 
restrictions on travel, First Amendment speech, and 
organizational rights, it must be permissible for a condition to 
require an inmate to forego further appeals and habeas petitions. 
Plea bargaining is the engine that runs the American criminal 
justice system137 and a key component of that system is that 
defendants waive most of their appellate rights in exchange 
for a charge or sentencing bargain.138 If defendants can 
constitutionally waive their appellate rights in exchange for a 
pre-trial plea bargain, it stands to reason that death-row 
inmates can do the same after conviction.  
Consider all of this in totality: (1) the federal and state 
constitutions grant sweeping clemency power to chief 
executives, (2) inmates have strong (and logical) autonomy 
interests in bargaining to avoid execution; (3) defendants are 
allowed to waive the very same appellate rights as part of a 
pre-trial plea bargain; and (4) courts have upheld even more 
questionable conditions, such as the ones in Hoffa and 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1699 (describing a condition that a 
prisoner violated by association with “unsavory characters”). Another leading 
clemency expert suggests additional scenariossuch as requiring a contribution 
to a president’s campaign or libraryas unenforceable. See Daniel T. Kobil, 
Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS. 
L.J. 698, 718 (2012) (providing examples of likely unconstitutional conditions). 
 136. See Krent, supra note 34, at 1692 (noting that another rare instance 
that could trump an inmate’s autonomy is when a condition “lengthens the 
punishment meted out by a court”).  
 137. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market, supra note 37, at 
1121 (noting that, from 1970 to 2000, most criminal cases were resolved by plea 
bargain). 
 138. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of 
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 143 (1999) (arguing that, even with 
limitations, plea bargains would not work without waivers of rights). 
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Carchedi, that seemingly impinge on core constitutional 
principles. This combination of factors should leave little 
doubt that it is constitutional for a governor to condition a 
commutation on an inmate foregoing all further appeals and 
habeas corpus petitions. 
V. It Is Not Difficult to Identify (Some) Weak Capital Cases 
Early in the Appellate Process 
Having established the constitutionality of using 
clemency to engage in post-trial plea bargaining, the next 
question is would governors practically be able to identify the 
weak cases that should be commuted? In other words, would 
it be too difficult for governors to know early in the appellate 
process that a case is likely to be reversed on appeal? Some 
critics might object that the legal problems most likely to lead 
to an appellate or habeas reversal cannot be known early in a 
capital case. Indeed, some legal issues that account for a 
considerable number of reversalsfor instance, ineffective 
assistance of counsel and Brady violations139are typically 
not even brought until after a hearing in the habeas corpus 
process.140 
The argument that governors won’t know enough early in the 
process to make an informed decision about which sentences to 
commute has some merit, but it is certainly not fatal. It is true 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of 
the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 90 (2005) (describing the findings of a study 
that looked at when these two arguments for reversal occur). See generally 
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET. AL, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 
1973–1995 (2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/ 
liebman_final.pdf (tracking the reasons for reversals in capital cases). 
 140. Some states do not allow ineffective assistance claims to be brought 
until after direct review is completed. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural 
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 (2007) (explaining that “the vast majority of 
jurisdictions do not allow defendants to open or supplement the trial court 
record to support [ineffective assistance] claims”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C.L. REV. 1069, 1097 & n.165 (2009) 
(noting that “the review of ineffective assistance review is largely limited to 
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that in many cases it would be very hard for governors to know 
whether a case will survive the appellate gauntlet. I am happy to 
concede that governors will not be able to perfectly predict which 
cases will be reversed. I concede that because my proposal does 
not require governors to weed out all of the weak cases or even 
most of them. My proposal is that governors should only select 
the obviously weak cases.141  
Sometimes governors might guess wrong and allow a weak 
case to remain in the system. Sometimes they might remove a 
case from death row that could have survived appellate scrutiny. 
I certainly do not suggest otherwise. My argument is only that 
there are a sizeable number of cases in which governors’ educated 
guesses are likely to be accurate, and those cases are worth 
millions in litigation costs.  
So, how would governors know which cases to commute? The 
first obvious set of cases would be the ones in which an appellate 
court was divided on direct review. When judges dissent on direct 
review they typically write detailed opinions specifying their 
reasons. Governors could simply have their legal counsel read 
and analyze the dissenting opinions to see if they find the 
dissenting opinions convincing. In assessing the divided cases, 
governors could also consider other factors about the dissents. 
For instance, was the dissent written by a judge with a 
reputation for being skeptical of the death penalty? Or was the 
dissent authored by a judge who has regularly upheld death 
sentences in the past? Was there only one dissenting vote, or did 
multiple judges believe that a death sentence was 
unconstitutional? In short, governors could utilize some 
background knowledge about the judiciary, do some nose 
counting, and have their counsel’s office do some legal analysis. 
In some cases this will be more than sufficient to hazard a good 
prediction that an inmate will probably not be executed. 
                                                                                                     
 141. The number of weak cases will vary across the United States. In some 
jurisdictions it might be a large percentage of cases. Think of California, which 
executes almost no one. In other states it might be a small percentage of cases. 
Think of Texas, which is quite skilled at quickly getting from death sentence to 
execution. I am certainly not suggesting that each state should commute an 
equal percentage of death sentences. 
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A second set of cases governors would look closely at would 
be ones in which a problematic actor had been involved in the 
prosecution.142 For instance, consider Dr. George Denkowski, a 
psychologist who examined at least sixteen defendants sentenced 
to death in Texas.143 Denkowski testified as an expert witness for 
the State of Texas and told juries that defendants met the 
intelligence threshold to be executed.144 Yet, psychologists and 
defense attorneys complained that Denkowski used unscientific 
methods that artificially inflated defendants’ intelligence scores 
in order to make them death eligible.145 In 2011, Dr. Denkowski 
reached a settlement with the Texas State Board of Examiners of 
Psychologists in which he agreed never to perform the tests again 
in exchange for complaints against him being dismissed.146 At the 
time of the settlement, fourteen of the sixteen inmates Dr. 
Denkowski testified against remained on death row.147  
After the rebuke of Dr. Denkowski, the governor of Texas 
could have, but did not, commute any of the death penalty cases 
Denkowski was involved in. Instead, costly litigation continued. 
For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the 
case of John Matamoros to the trial court to re-examine the 
psychological evidence.148 The trial court denied relief and the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, over the dissent of two judges, 
affirmed.149 The case then proceeded to wind its way through the 
                                                                                                     
 142. I am grateful to Professor Lee Kovarsky for making this point to me. 
 143. See Brandi Grissom, Texas Psychologist Punished in Death Penalty 
Cases, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2011), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/04/15/ 
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federal courts, where it remains today.150 Perhaps Matamoros 
will ultimately be executed. But there stands a good chance that 
his case (and the other cases involving Dr. Denkowski) will not 
end in executions.  
A third set of cases for governors to consider commuting are 
those likely to be effected by recent Supreme Court decisions. For 
instance, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. 
Virginia151 forbidding the execution of the mentally retarded, it 
was unclear who qualified as mentally handicapped.152 Almost 
any legal observer could have predicted that litigating that 
question would take years. And, indeed, in the nearly fifteen 
years since Atkins there has been a tremendous amount of legal 
wrangling. During that time, courts have reversed the death 
sentences of ninety-eight inmates because of a finding of mental 
handicap or retardation.153 Some of those reversals might not 
have been predicted. But governors surely could have looked at 
the evidence in a number of those Atkins cases and predicted that 
the death sentences would be overturned. Indeed, in roughly a 
dozen of those cases, the inmates had IQ scores in the fifties.154 
Governors in these and other cases could have preemptively 
granted clemency to short circuit the time-consuming and 
expensive appellate process.  
In asserting that governors can predict that certain death 
sentences are likely to be reversed, I do not want to over-claim. I 
am not asserting that governors will know the outcome of all or 
even most death sentences. And I am not guaranteeing that 
governors would always predict correctly without engaging in 
false positives or false negatives. I am asserting only that in some 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Matamoros v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 212, 227 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding 
that Matamoros was competent to be executed). 
 151. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 152. See id. at 304 (giving the authority to the states to determine how to 
evaluate mental handicap). 
 153. See Defendants Whose Death Sentences Have Been Reduced Because of a 
Finding of “Mental Retardation” Since Atkins v. Virginia (2002), DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2395 (last updated 
July 19, 2012) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (detailing the “wide variations among 
states in exempting defendants with intellectual disability from the death 
penalty”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 154. Id. 
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cases governors can make educated guesses that are very likely to 
be correct, and that those estimations would save the states a 
tremendous amount of time and money. If that is correct, the 
remaining question is whether governors would make those 
commutation deals or whether politics would stand in the way. 
VI. Politics Is Not a Fatal Obstacle to Post-Trial Plea Bargaining 
Via Executive Clemency 
The most significant objection to a proposal for governors to 
use their clemency power to plea bargain weak cases out of the 
system is that governors will not be willing to take the political 
risk. The conventional wisdom is that commutations are bad 
politics and that governors, who often want to be presidents, are 
not interested in anything that is bad politics. Thus governors try 
to pass the buck to pardon boards and the courts so as not to be 
responsible for executions.155 
The paltry number of individualized commutationsroughly 
seventy in forty yearssuggests that the conventional wisdom is 
correct. Moreover, when governors have gone out on a limb and 
commuted the sentences of murderers, they have suffered 
criticism and occasional electoral defeats. For instance, Governor 
Mike Huckabee was criticized for granting clemency to a man 
who went on to murder four police officers.156 Decades earlier, 
Governor Michael DiSalle of Ohio likely lost re-election in part 
because he commuted six death sentences.157 And although not a 
commutation, the furlough of convicted murderer Willie Horton 
in Massachusetts (who subsequently raped a woman) was 
                                                                                                     
 155. See The Diffusion of Responsibility, supra note 40, at 671–73 (listing 
examples of governors, courts, and pardon boards all saying that it is one of the 
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 156. See Clemency and Presidential Administration, supra note 60, at 823 
(explaining why some pundits thought this grant of clemency would limit 
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 157. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the 
Pardoning Power From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 607–08 (1991) (describing 
how the press mocked the governor for seeming “soft” on crime). 
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politically devastating to Governor Michael Dukakis as he ran for 
president.158 
The argument for the conventional wisdom is strong, but 
there are reasons to be skeptical of the contention that governors 
will never embrace executive clemency. Starting with the 
non-capital context, governors with future aspirations have been 
more willing to grant clemency than people recognize. As 
Professor Rachel Barkow has explained, Governor Mike 
Huckabee granted clemency to more than 1,000 people, many 
during his first term in office.159 Other governors with bright 
political futuressuch as Tim Kaine of Virginia and Robert 
Ehrlich of Marylandmade robust use of their clemency 
power.160 Indeed, even the most politically savvy 
politicianssuch as Governor (and former head of the Republican 
National Committee) Haley Barbouraggressively exercised 
clemency power in recent years.161 
Turning to the capital context, Professor Michael Heise’s 
careful empirical study of clemency grants found that political 
variables had no statistically significant impact.162 A few 
anecdotal examples further the story. For instance, John Kasich 
was elected governor of Ohio in 2010 after a long political career 
in Washington, D.C. and with well-known aspirations to run for 
president. (In fact, Kasich did run for president in 2016.) Shortly 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Criminal Justice Overhaul Is Haunted by 
Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01 
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 160. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias 
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regarding their grants of clemency). 
 161. See Cara H. Drinan: Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 
1123, 1149–50 (2012) (noting that many of these grants of clemency are still 
being challenged in the courts). 
 162. See generally Heise, supra note 11, at 983–84. 
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after taking office, Governor Kasich commuted five death 
sentences. The reasons for the commutations were variedlevel 
of involvement in the crime, abusive childhood, mental 
incapacity, lack of a life without parole option, and poor legal 
representationbut notably in none of the cases was there strong 
evidence of innocence.163 These commutations therefore carried 
some political risk, but Governor Kasich granted the 
commutations anyway. 
When Maryland abolished capital punishment in 2013, it did 
not do so retroactively, thus leaving four inmates on death row.164 
Governor Martin O’Malley, who had plans to run for president, 
could have ignored those four inmates, but he commuted their 
sentences to life without parole.165 
Relatedly, over the last decade there has been a growing 
consensus that cost is a major factor in criminal justice 
decision-making. As Professor Cara Drinan has explained, “the 
economic downturn has forced even states with the toughest 
record on criminal sanctions to reconsider sentencing policy.”166 
Texas declined to build expensive new prisons and instead 
diverted offenders to treatment programs.167 Multiple states have 
softened drug-sentencing laws to reduce the costs of 
incarceration.168 Conservative politiciansa group formerly at 
the forefront of tough on crime politicsformed the “Right on 
                                                                                                     
 163. Clemency, supra note 48. 
 164. See Alan Blinder, Life Sentences for Last Four Facing Death in 
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POST-TRIAL PLEA BARGAINING IN CAPITAL CASES 1393 
Crime” movement in an effort to promote cost-effective criminal 
justice.169 
I am not arguing that governors are now ready to robustly 
embrace capital clemency. Rather, I am making the more modest 
assertion that there are weaknesses in the conventional story 
that governors are petrified of commuting death sentences. And 
with the emerging recognition around the country that costs 
should factor into criminal justice decision-making, there is room 
for governors to consider using their power to engage in post-trial 
plea bargaining. 
VII. Conclusion 
Only days before Robert Gattis was to be executed in early 
2012, Governor Jack Markell of Delaware commuted Gattis’ 
death sentence because he had been physically and sexually 
abused as a child.170 Governor Markell conditioned the 
commutation as follows: 
 (1) Mr. Gattis shall forever drop all legal challenges to 
his conviction and sentence, as commuted; (2) Mr. Gattis 
shall forever waive any right to present a future 
commutation or pardon request and agree to live out his 
natural life in the custody of the Department of 
Correction; (3) Mr. Gattis will be housed in the 
Maximum Security Unit . . . and (4) Mr. Gattis, after 
consultation with counsel, shall knowingly, willingly and 
voluntarily accept these conditions, as determined by the 
Superior Court.171 
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Gattis agreed to the conditions, the commutation moved forward, 
and Gattis was spared execution.  
On the surface, Governor Markell’s conditional commutation 
seems to be the approach I have advocated for in this Article. The 
governor and an inmate struck a deal whereby the governor 
granted commutation and the inmate agreed to forego future 
appeals. However, the Gattis commutation differed in a 
significant respect from the approach I have advocated. Governor 
Markell granted clemency after the appeals process had run its 
course and only days before Gattis was to be executed. As such, 
Governor Markell did not procure a tangible benefit for the State 
of Delaware in exchange for the commutation. While we can 
debate whether it would be morally preferable to execute or not 
execute Gattis, there is no question that Governor Markell’s last-
minute commutation did not save the State of Delaware money 
by reducing costly litigation.  
This Article has argued that governors should not limit 
clemency simply to situations in which executions seem morally 
questionable. Governors should instead more broadly utilize their 
clemency power to improve the functioning of the capital 
punishment system. Capital clemency should be used as a form of 
post-trial plea bargaining in which governors weed weak cases 
out of the system. Governors should engage in clemency 
bargaining early in the appellate life of a capital case. When 
there is a good indication that a capital case will not end in 
execution, perhaps because judges dissented on direct review and 
foreshadowed a later appellate or habeas reversal, governors 
should strike a deal with the death-row inmate. In exchange for 
clemency, the inmate must give up all further appellate review of 
the case. Such conditional commutations would be perfectly 
constitutional. And in a sizeable number of cases, the deal would 
be in the best interests of the State and the death-row inmate.  
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